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Book Reviews
A POETICS OF RENAISSANCE CULTURE
Renaissance Self-Fasbiolling: From More to Shakespeare by Stephen Greenblatt. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. x
321.
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The title of Stephen Greenblatt's brilliant new book will recall to readers his
admirable study of Sir Walter Relegh, subtitled "The Renaissance Man
and His Roles." 1 In an Epilogue to Renaissance Self -Fashioning, Greenblatt
suggests that he originally conceived the new book along the lines of the
earlier one:
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I intended to explore the ways in which major English writers of the
sixteenth century created their own performances ... to understand
the role of human autonomy in the construction of identity .... But as
my work progressed, I perceived that fashioning oneself and being
fashioned by cultural institutions-family, religion, state-were inseparably
intertwined .... "\iVhenever I focllSed sharply upon a moment of apparently autonomous self-fashioning, I found not an epiphany of identity
freely chosen but a cultural artifact. If there remained any traces of
free choice, the choice was among possibilities whose range was strictly
delineated by the social and ideological system in force. (256)
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The book Greenblatt had intended to write would have been a good one; the
book he has actually written is undoubtedly better.
Discarding naive and nostalgic notions of the Renaissance, Greenblatt formulates a paradigm of sixteenth-century self-fashioning that is fit for an iron age:
We may say that self-fashioning occurs at the poiot of encounter between
an authority and an alien, that what is produced in this encounter partakes of both the authority and the alien that is marked for attack,
and hence that any achieved identity always contains within itself the
signs of its own subversion or loss. (9)
Self-fashioning ... requires both an enabling institution, a source of power
and communal values ... and a perception of the not-self, of all that lies
outside, or resists, or threatens identity. (177)
All relationships in sixteenth-century society are relationships of differential
power. And in the cultural logic of the Renaissance, the nature of such power
1 Stephen ]. Greenblatt, Sir }Valter Ralegb:
The Renaissance Alan and His
Roles (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1973).
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is epitomized in a complementary relationship between the glorified body of the
prince and the tortured body of the deviant. Thus it is a darker vision of the
Renaissance-one influenced by Freud and Foucault, as well as by much recent
historical research-that emerges from this work: a vision of repression and
"regenerative violence/' of xenophobia and exploitation, of subversion and
persecution. By refusing simply to reaffirm the critical and ethical pieties
entrenched in Tudor literary studies, Renaissance Self-Fashioning challenges our
understanding of Renaissance culture. It thereby enlarges our understanding
of our own culture, which has constituted" The Renaissance" in conformity with
modem ideologies of personal and aesthetic autonomy.
The book consists of a theoretical introduction and six chapters, organized
into Henrician and Elizabethan triads. Each chapter is centered upon a writer
whose work is "the focal point for converging lines of force in sixteenthcentury culture" (5): More, Tynd:Jle, and i,Vyatt; Spenser, l\1arlowe, and
Shakespeare. 2 These chapters vary considerably in their scope: from a monograph on More's life and writings to a reading of Othello, from an analysis
of early Protestant mentality, as revealed in polemical discourse and acts of
martyrdom, to a delineation of the psycho-social paradigm variously embodied
in Marlowe's dramatic heroes. The chapters on i,Vyatt and Spenser tell us
much about the politics and cultural styles of the Henrician and Elizabethan
courts. But whereas the range of vVyatt's poetry is discussed in some detail,
consideration of Spcnser's great poetic corpus is largely confined to a single
canto (II. xii) of The Faerie Queene. From trus initial description, the book
might seem to be merely an eccentric melange. In fact, it is a powerful and
coherent work of criticism, an exemplary contribution to what Greenblatt himself calls "a poetics of culture." A review cannot do justice to the interpretive
riches of Renaissance Self-Fashioning. I shall merely summarize the central
points of the individual chapters-raising questions about some of them-and
discuss the book's theoretical and methodological import for Renaissance studies.

II
Greenblatt describes the subject of his first and longest chapter as "the
complex interplay in l\10re's life and writings of self-fashioning and selfcancellation, the shaping of a public role and the profound desire to escape
from the identity so crafted)) (12-13). More's" life strategy" was the attempt
to maintain, under enormous pressure, "a calculated distance between the
public persona and the inner self" (68). The debate between 1\10rus and Hythlodaeus that opens Utopia projects a dialectic between More's public self and
the private consciousness that \-vas alienated from his own compromises and
complicities. In a stimulating 2nalysis of Utopian social and family organization, Greenblatt suggests that "private O\vnership of property is causally
linked in Utopia to private o\vnership of self"; "to abolish private property
is to render such self-conscious individuality obsolete" (38-39). Thus Utopian
l! Four previously published essays-on More, Marlowe
(2), and Shakespeareare here incorporated in revised form.
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communism fictively resolves More's felt need to negate his m·vn inwardness.
Greenblatt conceives of Utopia as a complex symbolization of More's ambivalent
psyche; it "functions as a playground in which a shifting series of apparently
incompatible impulses can find intense expression without flying apart or
turning violently on each other" (57). When the historical moment which
made this tenuous ludic equilibrium possible had passed-when "the consensus
fidelium" (63) was threatened by radical reform-then the elements of More's
consciousness fused successfully in Utopia began to break apart. Greenblatt
traces this process in More's subsequent life and in his polemical writings.
The second chapter explores further the psycho-social crises of the Reformation. That genuinely revolutionary moment is the scene for the acts and
monuments of early Protestant self-fashioning. Greenblatt sees More and
Tyndale as mighty opposites pursuing antithetical means to a similar end:
"Both achieve guaranteed access to a truth that lies beyond individual or
social construction, beyond doubt or rebellion" -More, through the mediations
of the Catholic Church; Tyndale, through those of "a sacred text illuminated
by faith" (111). The new mode of interiority being formed in the early
sixteenth century was inseparable from a new mode of communication: the
vernacular printed book.
Wyatt, the third author in Greenblatt's Henrician triad, is unlike More
in that he "has no supreme consensus, set apart from royal power and
made visible in an enduring institution" j and unlike Tyndale in that he "does
not give himself over entirely to the Word: theological self-fashioning-the
power of the book over identity-cannot be long separated from secular selffashioning-the power of sexual and political struggles at court" (116). Wyatt's
spiritual, diplomatic and amorous experiences are shown to be interwined in
the life of his poetry. Greenblatt's Wyatt is no romantic rebel but a Tudor
courtier whose fashioning of self and poems is constituted by the conventions
of domination and submission which pervade his society. Wyatt's poetry, then,
is " a species of conduct" designed for survival and advancement in a predatory
environment. The psalms, satires, and lyrics are various "functional registers
of his relation to the world" (135). By this, Greenblatt does not mean to
imply that Wyatt's poetry is a mere "reflection" of the ideology which
produced it. He invokes the Marxist aesthetic theory of "internal distantiation"Louis Althusser's strategy for redeeming art from its banishment to the superstructure-so as to maintain that "a gap beween discourse and intention opens
up in Wyatt." This" gap" makes it possible" for his greatest poems to engage
in complex reflections upon the system of values that has generated them"
(156). In such lyrics, Greenblatt senses a "suspension ... between impositions of
the self 011 the world and critical exploration of inwardness" (156). I find the
readings of Wyatt's texts compelling. But I wonder exactly what Greenblatt
means when he calls their condition of "continual conflict" and "suspension" a
dialectical acbievement and attributes the achievement to Wyatt himself (156).
Greenblatt's use of Althusserian notions sometimes fails to lceep the ideological
operations in the text and the consciousness of the poet theoretically distinct. 3
II

The vexed relationship between ideology and literary production is discussed
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Greenblatt states the interpretive problem of The Faerie Queene, Book Two,
canto twelve, as "why the particular erotic appeal of the Bower ... excites the
hero's destructive violence" (171). Grounded more in Freudian metapsychology than in Aristotelian ethics, his reading of the text departs radically from
the current orthodoxies of Spenser criticism. For him, "the Bower of Bliss
must be destroyed not because its gratifications are unreal but because they
threaten 'civility' -civilization-which for Spenser is achieved only through
renunciation and the constant exercise of power" (173). Thus the destruction
of the Bower of Bliss is an exemplum of civilization's discontents, an epitome
of the conflict between intense desire and anxious repression that Greenblatt
sees as characteristic of the whole poem. He acknowledges that the episode is
" embedded in a narrative that is shaped throughout by the Poet's complex moral
intelligence" (171) but he does not produce a reading of the preceding eleven
cantos of the book. He is concerned with the fashioning of the fictional hero's
self-and, by analogy, the selves of the author and the reader-rather than with
the sustained fashioning of the text. Seizing upon Freud's homology between
sexual repression and social oppression, Greenblatt elaborates three "reiterations
by the culture of important elements of the destruction of the Bower of Bliss:
the European response to the native cultures of the New World, the English
colonial struggle in Ireland, and the Reformation attack on images" (179).
This procedure is a brilliant tour-de-force which succeeds in illuminating the
cultural pattern embedded in Spenser's text. Spenser's View of the Present
State of Ireland and his participation in the systematic destruction of HibernoNorman civilization are related to The Bower of Bliss and The Faerie Queene
in a new, disturbing, and (for tlus reader) convincing way.
On the other hand, I remain unconvinced by the final conclusion that
Spenser's art does not lead us to perceive ideology critically, but rather
affirms the existence and inescapable moral power of ideology as that
principle of truth toward which art forever yearns. It is art whose status
is questioned in Spenser, not ideology; indeed, art is questioned precisely
to spare ideology that intelnal distantiation it undergoes in the work
of Shakespeare or Marlowe. (192)
This seriously underestimates the complexity and ambivalence of Spenser's
poetic discourse. Spenser's poetry repeatedly puts into question the "truth"
claims of the courtly ideology and courtly aesthetics it ostensibly embodies.
Greenblatt's own sense that the whole poem is characterized by "an intense
craving for release" (178) from the ideology it promotes and by moments of
" disillusionment" (I79) would seem to undermine his own categorical conclusion. I would argue that there are throughout Spenser's poetry moments
in a stimulating (if tentative and stylistically uningratiating) way in Terry Eagleton, O'iticism and Ideology (London: New Left Books, 1976). Eagleton maintains that "there is ... a peculiar 'ideology of the text', reducible to neither
, general' nor 'authorial' ideologies, which in any two texts would be the
same only if those texts were verbally identical" (p. 99). Eagleton criticizes
Althusser's concept of "internal distantiation" on pp. 82iI.

BOOK REVIEWS

353

of precisely that "internal distance" which allow us to perceive critically the
ideology in which the poem is held. Nevertheless, whatever objections one
may raise against it-and these are likely to vary with the critical persuasions
and vested interests of particular critics-this chapter of Greenblatt's book
is certainly one of the most stimulating and significant pieces of Spenser
criticism to have appeared in recent years.
Greenblatt sees in Marlovian drama a varied but sustained expression of "a
I2.dically intensified sense that time is abstract, uniform, and inhuman" (199).
Typically, Marlovian heroes impose their own forms on inchoate experience
by committing acts of violence against others and against themselves. The
Marlovian paradigm for self-fashioning is the repetition compulsion of his
heroes' acts: "Identity is a theatrical invention that must be reiterated if it is
to endure" (201). In the work of More, Tyndale, Wyatt, and Spenser,
identity is achieved through an attack on the alien; "in Marlowe it is achieved
through a subversive identification with the alien" (203). The ambiguity in
Greenblatt's illuminating argument lies in the nature of the relationship between
Marlowe and his heroes: in what sense do his heroes' fictional acts of se1£fashioning articulate Marlowe's own self-fashioning? As Greenblatt points out,
Marlowe's heroes do not so much depart from as invert the paradigms of
Elizabethan orthodoxy. The attempts of Tamburlaine, Barabas, Edward, and
Faustus to challenge this system" are subjected to relentless probing and exposed
as unwitting tributes to that social construction of identity against which they
struggle" (209). The implication is that Marlowe, having eluded the hegemony
of his culture, conducts this investigation and exposure of his characters' entrapment within it. Here Greenblatt suggests a radically ironic relationship between
the dramatist and his characters; but elsewhere he admits a considerable degree
of identification: "In his turbulent life and, more important, in his writing,
Marlowe is deeply implicated in his heroes, though he is far more intelligent
and self-aware than any of them" (220). I am less convinced than Greenblatt
seems to be that Marlowe's plays demonstrate his absolute artistic control, selfawareness, and philosophical detachment.4 Are the relentless probings and
exposures of his heroes' attempts at subversion the work of Marlowe's consciousness? Or are they the textual embodiments of those ironies and contradictions in Marlowe's historical situation which are accessible only to the
perceptive modern reader?
The final chapter opens with a subtle explication of "the improvisation of
power." For Greenblatt, improvisation is "the ability both to capitalize on
the unforseen and to transform given materials into one's own scenario" (227).
Such improvisation is made possible by "the subversive perception of another's
truth as an ideological construct" (228), yet one which resembles the belief
system of the improvisator. A felicitous example of tIus concept in action is
the appropriation of Catholic and particularly Marian symbolism by the Elizabethan
4. For example: "Marlowe stands apart then from both orthodoxy and skepticism; he calls into question the theory of literature and history as repeatable
moral lessons, and he calls into question his age's characteristic mode of rejecting
those lessons" (212).
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regime. But Greenblatt's central text is Othello; and his focus is upon Othello's
undoing by Iaga's improvisation. Iaga plays upon Christian doctrines that
censured intense sexual pleasure within marriage as a lund of adultery; he does
so precisely because Othello's self is divided between desire for and fear of such
pleasure. The mechanism which impels Guyon to ravage Acrasia's Bower is that
which impels Othello to "purify" Desdemona by violence: "He must destroy
Desdemona both for her excessive experience of pleasure and for awakening
such sensations in himself" (250). This chapter provides a stimulating rhetorical
and socia-cultural context for ,a psychoanalytic reading of the tragedy.
Greenblatt sees his triad of Henrician writers as collectively enacting "a
momentous ideological shift in early modern England from the consensus fidelmm
embodied in the universal Catholic Church to the absolutist claim of the Book
and the King" (157). Such cohesiveness is less apparent in his Elizabethan
triad. Here he concentrates more on texts than on the direct connections
between a text and the life of its author. A )Vider range of texts and topics
is discussed in each chapter; at the same time, the royal presence wanes. The
pervasive force of Henry's personality and policies contributes to the unity of the
first three studies. In the Elizabethan half of the book, Elizabeth and her
regime seem central only to Spenser's work. Indeed, Othello is very much
a Jacobean play, not only in tenns of chronology but in tenns of style.
Greenblatt does not explore the significance of such differences. An analysis
of the apparent absence of the royal Other from the texts of Marlowe and
Shakespeare might have illuminated some of the book's major concerns.
The "higher levels of conscious artistry" in later sixteenth-century writing
are said to create II more complex and seemingly autonomous characters in
fully realized fictional worlds" (161). This is an unexceptionable description
of the rapid transformation of the dmmu; and it is to this multi-media art fonn
and its distinctive socio-economic matrix that many of Greenblatt's generalizations
about the literature of the later sixteenth century best apply:
It becomes increasingly possible for at least a small number of men to
conceive of literature as their primary activity: as we pass from Spenser
to Marlowe and Shakespeare, we move toward a heightened investment
of professional identity in artistic creation. Consequently, it becomes
easier to discuss the formation and undermining of identity within
individual works without fonnally referring beyond them to the
lives of their creators. (161)li
G One
could argue that Shakespeare-playwright, actor, and entrepreneurmust have conceived of the theater as his primary activity; and that, of the
three writers, Spenser is most likely to have conceived of literature (in the sixteenth century, a category socially distinct from and superior to drama) as his
primary activity. Spenser might be thought of as founding a line of English
poets who invest their professional identity in artistic creation. Shakespearean
drama is an art ahnost anonymous, in which the authorial self is disseminated
into the text and into its perfonnance; Spenserian poetry, however, is the very
medium of laureate self-fashioning. See Richard Helgerson, "The Elizabethan
Laureate: Self-Presentation and the Literary System," ELH, 46 (1979), 193-220.
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The change of focus from the fashioning of persons to the fashioning of
characters is perhaps too easily accomplished. If the book has a theoretical and
methodological shortcoming, it consists in Greenblatt's reluctance to problematize his central terms; fasbioning and self-fashioning. Although it may sometimes
be difficult or impossible in practice, in theory we should distinguish and interrelate
four processes: an author's self-fashioning in action; an author's self-fashioning
in 'ulriting; an author's fashioning of a character (whether it be a lyric persona
or a narrative character; the hero of a drama or merely an attendant lord);
and the author's fashioning of the text itself, "\vithin which "character "-and
every particular character-is constituted as a textual effect. 6
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Although Greenblatt's thinking is explicitly indebted to Freud, he is
unconcerned to commit himself to one among the several current paths of
clinical and literary psychoanalytic theory. He justly characterizes his study of
Renaissance self-fashioning as "cultural or anthropological criticism" (4). Thus!
the strongest psychoanalytic affinities of his work are with recent studies emphasizing the historical and cultural specificity of psychological phenomena: with
Arthur F. Marotti's welcome insistence that "a socio-cultural system not only
inculcates cenain ideals, values, sublimations-that is, superego and ego formations-but also ... the very shapes of (' instinctive ') desire and need"; and
with William Kerrigan's exemplary demonstration that" our anatomy of Renaissance creativity must ... explore the shared symbolic context within which the
ego spoke." 1
Greenblatt describes his chosen authors as "individuals who reward intense
attention and give access to larger patterns" (6); and in some chapters the
emphasis is upon the individual, in others, upon the larger pattern. His subject
is the cultural and culture-specific construction or (to use the apposite Elizabethan
term) the fasbioning of identity in both literary characters and historical persons.
Such fashioning is performed-and is only accessible to us-in texts, texts of
every kind: not only poems, plays and narrative fictions but also polemical tracts
and travel accounts, letters and diaries, official proclamations and diplomatic
dispatches, paintings and pageants. Thus Greenblatt's method implies that
the notion which privileges "literature" as an autonomous discourse belongs to
a post-Renaissance aesthetic ideology. The distinction between poetic language
and ordinary language is illusory: "There is no sharp break between literature
6 Dramatic texts imply a further process, one that is of great interest but
difficult to analyze historically: the actor's fashioning of a dramatic role and his
self-fashioning through such professional role-playing. For some speculations, see
Louis Adrian Montrose, " The Purpose of Playing: Reflections on a Shakespearean
Anthropology," Heiiar, N.S., 7 (1980), 51-74.
'1 Arthur F. Marotti, "Countertransference, the Communication Process, and
the Dimensions of Psychoanalytic Criticism," Critical inquiry, 4 (1978), 486;
William Kerrigan, "The Articulation of the Ego in the English Renaissance/'
in The Literary Frez~d: Mechanisms of Defense and the Poetic Will, ed. Joseph
H. Smith, M.D. (New Haven and London: Yale Dniv. Press, 1980), p. 290.
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and social life." Furthermore, there is no sharp break bet\Veen the ontogeny
of poems and the ontogeny of persons; "humans [are] cultural artifacts" (3).
Thus a "poetics of culture" envisions the "self" as a unique incarnation of
cultural coding. And Greenblatt envisions literature as having three interlocking
"functions" within the cultural process by which selves are fashioned: "Literature functions ... as a manifestation of the concrete behavior of its particular
author, as itself the expression of the codes by which behavior is shaped, and
as a reflection upon those codes" (4). Each of these functions may be the
subject of a critical practice which reduces the text to an epiphenomenon-a
reflection of authorial biography, of material infrastructure, or of ideal forms,
respectively. Greenblatt's own practice attempts to address all of these functions.
Thus, cultural poetics is a kind of "balancing act" (5). (This is a revealing
phrase, for in Greenblatt's work one is frequently reminded that writing
criticism is an intellectual and rhetorical performance, and that reading criticism
can be exhilarating experience.)
As this review has begun to suggest, "culture" is one of the cardinal terms
in Greenblatt's study. For his definition of culture and the theoretical orientation
of his work, he acknowledges a debt to The Interpretation of Cultures, by
anthropologist Clifford Geerrz.8 For Geerrz and Greenblatt, culture is primarily
the medium of sign production, of semiosis; it is the system of codes which
" govern" the production of social life and the production of these ensembles
of conventions and artifacts to which the term" culture" is often loosely applied.
This is a version of what anthropologist Marshall Sahlins calls "the symbolic
or meaningful" concept of culture, in which "human action in the world
is to be understood as mediated by the cultural design, which gives order at
once to practical experience, customary practice, and the relationship between
the two." 9 What Geertz's work offers to literary critics and social historians
is not a powerful theory of culture (Sahlins' work has greater theoretical power)
but rather an exemplary method for describing "culture" in action, an ethnographic practice of great subtlety and richness. This" thick description II (as
Geertz calls it) seizes upon an event or institution-an informant's narrative
about sheep-stealing in Morocco; the ethnographer's observation of cockfights
in Bali-and interrogates it in such a way as to reveal through the analysis of
minute particulars the dynamics of a whole society, the lineaments of a culture.
To say that Greenblatt's practice of "thick description 7l is brilliant is both
to judge its content and to describe its style. In his introduction, Greenblatt
reassures us that literary texts are" the central object" of his attention. They
are so because" great art is an extraordinarily sensitive register of the complex
struggles and harmonies of culture" (5), and because his own inclinations
and training fit him for the interpretation of literature. It seems to me, however,
B The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books,
1973). This anthropological text seems to be congenial to increasing numbers
of historians and literary critics.
Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago and London: Dniv. of Chicago Press,
19i6), pp. viii, 55. Some would so enlarge the meaning of "ideology" as to
make it coterminous with this sense of "culture."
(I
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that the excitement and importance of Greenblatt's work derive less from his
readings of particular literary texts than from his powers of intertextual analysis:
he has a remarkable ability to insert a highly wrought verbal artifact that has
secured a major place in the literary canon into a context of contemporaneous
events, objects, and (uncanonical) texts, in such a way that a mutual illumination occurs and a cultural paradigm is revealed.
Typically, Greenblatt begins with an "unliterary" bit of sixteenth century
culture: for example. the events leading to the martyrdom of one John Bainham,
a lapsed heretic examined by Lord Chancellor Thomas More; or an incident
involving Spanish beguilement and enslavement of a Bahamian tribe, as recounted
by Peter Martyr. Analysis of such events and texts reveals principles which
are then shown to be operative in acts of literary self-lashioning by the major
authors upon whose work the chapters are focused. Thus, the first example
strikingly exemplifies the centrality of the printed vernacular Bible to the life
of the early Protestant community; and Bainham's self-fashioning literally
embodies the antithetical relationship between More and Tyndale. The second
example is used to formulate the concept of improvisatory power which
characterizes the perverted genius of Iago; and to point to the aura of exotic,
barbaric otherness which divides Othello from the Venetians and divides him
against himself. It should be no~ed that Greenblatt makes extensive and highly
effective use of the sixteenth-century literature of exploration and colonization
throughout Renaissance Self-Fashioning. Indeed, one of the genuine achievements of Greenblatt's cultural poetics is to analyze the extraordinary phenomenon
of Renaissance travel and conquest with unprecedented sophistication; and to
reveal its profound (and profOlmdly unglamorous) relevance to larger patterns
in Elizabethan culture.tO Thus I must question Greenblatt's own affirmation
that the analysis of II great art" (an unexamined category) belongs at the
center of a II poetics of culture" (5). For, paradoxically, his own interpretive
powers suggest that a cultural artifact that may not be classed as II great art"
or as "art" at all may nevertheless be II an extraordinarily sensitive register of
the complex struggles and harmonies of culture." Certainly, the implication of
Greenblatt's practice is that all texts-indeed, all cultural artifacts-demand and
reward interpretation.
In the Introduction to Renaissance Self-Fashioning, Greenblatt confesses
that if cultural poetics is conscious of its status as interpretation, this consciousness must extend to an acceptance of the impossibility of fully
10 Perhaps the most remarkable of these analyses-of ideological subversion in
Thomas Harriot's Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginiaoccurs in a recent essay which is, in some ways, an appendix to Renaissance SelfFashioning and, in others, the comencement of a new phase in his work:
Stephen Greenblatt, "Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and Its Subversions," Glyph: Johns Hopkins Textual Studies, 9 (1981). 40-61. See also an
earlier essay: Stephen J. Greenblatt, "Learning to Curse: Aspects of Linguistic
Colonialism in the Sixteenth Centurv," in First Images of America, ed. Fredi
Chiapelli, et al. 2 vols. (Berkeley; Univ. of California Press, 1976), II, 561-80.
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reconstructing and reentering the culture of the sixteenth century, of
leaving behind one's own situation: it is everywhere evident in this book
that the questions I ask of my material and indeed the very nature of this
material are shaped by the questions I ask of myself. (5)

Every criticism of Renaissance literature is practiced under the same constraints. Vihar distinguishes Greenblatt's "cultural poetics" is that it recognizes,
ackumvledges, and integrates those constraints within its discourse.
The important methodological implication of Greenblatt's practice has been
forcefully articulated by Michael McCanles in a recent anatomy of historicist
Renaissance criticism: "Instead of viewing the scholar's enterprise as merely the
recovery and explanation of an already constituted Renaissance text, Renaissance
studies should recognize that its central task lies in the constitution of that text
through an intertextuality whereby two texts are brought together and fused:
the constituted discourse of the Renaissance and the constitutive discourse of the
scholar himself." 11 Greenblatt does indeed recognize tIus task In a brief Epilogue, he tells the story of an abortive encounter between himself and a fellow
airplane passenger, wluch interrupted his re-reading of The Interpretation of
Cultures. In his final sentence, Greenblatt explains the purpose of this personal
travel narrative: "I want to bear witness at the close to my overwhelming need
to sustain the illusion that I am the principal maker of my own identity" (257).
At its consummation, Renaissance Self-Fashioning suggests that, for the critic,
the process of understanding his subject is inseparable from the processes of
writing Ius text and fashioning his self.
If the study of si~teenth-century English culture is a kind of ethnography,
then the practitioner of cultural poetics is a kind of anthropological fieldworker.
The nature of ethnograpluc practice has been provocatively described by Roy
Wagner in a recent work of anthropological theory. Wagner extends McCanles'
point about the constitutive discourse of the critic when he claims that:
an anthropologist" invents" the culture he believes himself to be studying .... In the act of inventing another culture, the anthropologist invents
his own, and in fact he reinvents the notion of culture itself....
The relation an anthropologist builds between two cultures-which, in
turn, objectifies and hence "creates" those cultures for him-arises
precisely from his act of "invention," Ius use of meanings known to
him in constructing an understandable representation of his subject
matter....
The study of culture is culture.12
In the work of the human sciences, all acts of description are necessarily acts of
construction, performed by interpreters of culture who are themselves artifacts of
culture. It is in this sense that <, a poetics of culture" is both a constituted and
a constitutive cultural practice; and that its practitioner is fashioned by what
11 tC The Authentic Discourse of the Renaissance," Diacritics, 10, no. 1 (March
1980),81.
12 Roy Wagner, The Invention of Culture, rev. and expanded ed. (Chicago and
London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 4, 9, 16.
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he fashions. Unlike many other areas of sixteenth-century studies, the criticism
of Tudor literature and drama remains relatively unaffected by the increasing
theoretical and methodological sophistication of the human sciences, and isolated
from the challenges and possibilities of dialectical and interdisplinary modes
of cultural analysis. Work like Stephen Greenblatt's promises to remedy these
deficiencies. Renaissance Self-Fashioning is a seminal contribution to our necessary reinvention of the English Renaissance. 1 !
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LOUIS ADRIAN MONTROSE

University of California, San Diego

Milton and the Martial Muse: Paradise Lost and the European Traditio'l/S of
War by James A. Freeman. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1980. Pp. xx
253
27 pI. $17.50.

+

+

One of the principal functions of Paradise Lost, argues James Freeman in his
Milton and the Martial Muse, is to reprove a generation that thought war
gave scope for true nobility. Freeman takes for granted that Milton disapproved
of war and that this disapproval is so clearly manifest in a work like Paradise
Lost that a critic need only review rather than prove the case that the epic
is one of the major anti-war works of the Renaissance. Freeman's aim, therefore, is
to show how Milton has marshalled the very machinery of war against its
ideological underpinnings, in order to convince his generation of its utter
wickedness and essential baseness. The" machinery of war," here, is the military
manuals of antiquity and the Renaissance, which praise the ar.t of warfare and
argue that it promotes reason, judgment, and virtue in human beings. Milton,
Freeman argues, has closely studied these texts and made Satan and his angels
such exemplary practitioners of the military arts that he exposes as devil's work
the very practices that antiquity and the Renaissance so highly praised. Freeman's
book focuses upon warfare as described by ancient and modem theoreticians,
making little reference to actual battles. Readers who are interested in an
analysis of the military arts in actual European warfare, or in the English Civil
War, must look to other books. Freeman argues, in suport of his approach, that
until the Civil War Englishmen like Milton had little direct experience with
warfaring, and that even when the Civil War came, their attitudes remained
largely those which had been shaped by the books on war read earlier.
The military textbooks, however, are not Freeman's only concern in this book.
He considers also relevant Biblical passages on war and the commentaries on
them, as well as sermons, and, at greater length, those Latin and Greek epics that
-deal with warfare. Attempting, in the first of the four long sections of the
book, to provide the reader with a broad general introduction, Freeman surveys
the attitudes of society toward war from ancient times through the Renaissance,
18 1 am grateful to Har.ry Berger, Don Wayne, and Frank Whigham for their
careful readings of my text. I have benefitted from their incisive comments.
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ending with an account of Milton's own attitudes, both before and during the
Civil War period. In this section too, he surveys the major books of war
that will be referred to throughout, giving particular emphasis to the De Re
Militari of Flavius Vegetius Renatus (c. A.D. 400). Vegetius becomes for Freeman a kind of "sample" war text, which he summarizes in order to epitomize
the waf texts themselves. He approaches the survey of history in a similar way,
but with less precise results, attempting to epitomize the attitudes of different
societies with a few apt quotations. His design is to show that the Renaissance
inherited many of the pro-war stances of ancient society, even though as a
Christian society it theoretically condemned what in practice it fully supported.
It was so normal, he maintains, for Renaissance writers to characterize the
soldierly arts as those which promote discipline, manhood, and peace that such
praise must necessarily show those arts had general approval. Freeman attempts
to demonstrate that Milton, in disapproving them, was out of step with most
of the writers of his generation.
It is at this point that, I believe, his reasoning becomes less than fully convincing. He argues that when Milton read the manuals of military arts in the
1630's and 40's, or tutored his nephews in these books, Milton was mastering that
which he detested. Further, he urges that Milton's consistent praising of the
arts of peace over those of war, and his arguing that citizens as well as soldiers
made contributions to society, are evidence of strong anti-war feeling. Yet
the praise of the arts of peace, hardly a sentiment to be found uniquely in
.Milton, but one almost commonplace in the Renaissance, need not argue strong
anti-militarism. Furthennore, Milton elsewhere praises military leaders and
soldiers of the Commonwealth in terms that resemble those cited in Renaissance
pro-war exponents. Further, in both Of Education and in later prose tracts Milton
seems to recognize the necessity of military training and to appreciate the service
that a loyal anny such as Cromwell mustered gave to a nation. The necessary conclusion would seem to be that neither is the Renaissance as a whole so solidly
pro-war nor John Milton the man so solidly anti-war as Freeman in this section
tends to urge.
Sections 2 and 3 of Milton and the Mar#al Muse turn to detailed exploration
of how the war books are used in Paradise Lost, and it is these sections, I
believe, that will be of most interest to readers. First, Freeman describes how
the rebel angels and Satan in category after category conform to the expectations that the war manuals had for good soldiers and the ideal general.
Whether in fonning orderly ranks or in keeping careful watch or in practicing
military exercises, the rebel angels are almost textbook creatures, and their
leader is no less the perfect dux belli. Freeman has expanded upon the work of
earlier scholars like Hanford who first suggested Milton's debt to the military
manuals, and he demonstrates how precisely Milton has adopted their terminology
and descriptions in his account of the activities of the rebel ,angels in books 1, 2.
and 6 of Pcrradise Lost. It is useful to know that Satan's bearing a baton is a
mark of military office or that the term" limitary," used by Satan to describe
Gabriel, is a term for a soldier on garrison duty or that the phrase "to order
the spear" has the precise military denotation of to hold the spear upright, but
at rest. Further. to lmow that .Milton took care to draw his description of
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the ensign bearer Azazel from a military manual shows us that Milton was intent
on making his angelic warriors look like their earthly counterparts. Freeman
has included a generous number of illustrations to document many of these
details, and so both in picture and in text has shown us the precision and depth
of Milton's knowledge of things military
Given that the "Hellish" virtues are in many cases precisely the highest
military virtues the Renaissance manuals praise, Freeman~s assumption that
Milton was thereby undercutting what his society thought most admirable seems
logical enough. Yet there are problems in arguing that Paradise Lost is a
direct attack upon the military arts. First of all, it is not the rebel angels alone
who are military creatures, nor is Milton, as Freeman implies, boldly original in
making Satan's angels soldiers, a role which they had been assigned since
the late Middle Ages in a good number of poems that Milton undoubtedly
lmew. The loyal angels are also soldiers, and successful ones, and their leader
Michael, as Freeman concedes, an .almost perfect example of what the Renaissance
expected of its military leaders. How then can Milton be said to approve of
soldiership in the one and disapprove of it in the other? Freeman's response is
cautious. He has chosen, in the central sections of the book, not to compare
the military activities of the loyal and the rebel angels, even though he does
state that the loyal angels were conventionally portrayed in Renaissance art as
soldiers. He ru-gues that it is the devils who are the "professional" soldiers,
who engage in war because they choose to, not, like God's angels, because they
must. Granting the general truth that Milton and his contemporaries thought
that Satan was the "father of war," we still might expect a fuller consideration
of those armies that fight a defensive war under the banners of the Lord of
Hosts, particularly since defensive or just warfare is, as F!eeman shows us, a
subject treated in the military manuals.
Another problem is that the very war manuals that assist Milton in constructing
portraits of Satan and his angels as exemplary soldiers are also drawn on, apparently, as Freeman shows us, for the critique of Satan's soldiership. The rebels
do not in the final analysis live up to the classical ideal of soldiership that the
war books foster, and the areas in which they fail are often exactly those in
which the loyal angels succeed. Freeman spends. considerable time exposing
their failure. Sometimes, their activities, such as the construction work that
Mannnon and his mgels undertake, betray a less than ideal soldiership. (Many
military manuals disapprove, Freeman tells us, of soldiers being used as pioneers.)
Other times, discipline fails them, as when they disband upon Satan's leaving
for earth or become a serpentine rabble on his return. All too often, they are
compared to the Barbarian hordes of the north and east and not the well-trained
Greek and Roman warriors the Renaissance prized. Satan as leader lacks the
personal integrity that many war books required in their general, for he
places revenge above the public good, behaves rashly and selfishly, and practices
fraud, which many, though not all, military experts condemned. (In a long
section on force and fraud, Freeman points out that some of the military experts
attempted to grant fraud under the name of strategy a kind of "damned»
respectability.) The war texts provided then the standard by which both Satan's
successes -and his failures were judged. Milton, therefore, at times echoed rather
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than undercut their views of proper military conduct. It would seem that his
attitude toward these books and perhaps toward the war conduct they recommended need not have been totally disapproving. Accordingly, some readers may
feel that it was not war that Milton condemned hut Satanic war.
Whether or not we agree that Milton aimed in Paradjs~ Lost to reprove the

militarists of bis time, we cannot belp being affected by tbe portrait of Satan
and his angels as thorough and well-disciplined Renaissance soldiers that Freeman

constructs for us. With· lmowledge not only of the war books he describes,
but of things military throughout tbe ages (there is an interesting account of
the military aspects of the bee simile in the final section), Freeman persuades
us how important contemporary military theories were to the characterization of

Satan and his angels as soldiers. Previous books have shown us how Milton
used the traditions of literary warfare-of epic and romance. Freeman has added
another dimension by making us see that Milton was also a student of theoretical
warfare, and so intended in Paradise Lost to depict not only the wars of Homer
and Virgil but warfare as designed by tbe theoreticians most respected by his
age.
SrEu.A P. REvARD
Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville

The Politic.l Unconscious: Namrtive as a Socially Symbolic Act by Fredric
Jameson. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1981. pp. $19.50.
In The Political Unconscious, Fredric Jameson has produced another vital
contribution to cultural study, packed with solid argument yet glittering with
energy and urgency. There is a long theoretical cbapter, followed by studies
of Balzac, Gissing and Conrad; but the real structure of the book is more complex
and more closely interlocking than this, and hinges on a polemic defence of the
concept of interpretation. With post-srructuralists playing quasi-Edenic games
on all sides, these could be seen as hard times for Jamesonian "metacommentary,"
which is here refined in various ways. It is seen as a method for focusing
textual study in such a way as to provide a continuous pretext for engagement
with other literary-critical methods; as a device for ensuring movement between
various "horizons" of attention, from the local ,and stylistic to the worldhistorical; and, I believe most interestingly, as a way of adapting certain
structuralist perceptions, through .a. process of " radical historicisation and problematisation," and pressing them into service as a politically subordinate technique,
but one peculiarly appropriate for laying bare the mechanisms of the static and
frozen world of ideology. The instrument of which Jameson is fondest is
Greimas' semiotic rectangle, which he puts to brilliant use in his analysis of
Lord Jim and Nostromo.
The polemic takes place athwart the axis of Althusserianism, for Jameson is
attempting to show that although, with Althusser, we have to agree about history
as actual absence, history nonetheless returns to us, exclusively in the form of
narrativization, collective fictions about the past which are susceptible of
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interpretation and can be made to yield contents within the political unconscious. One of the features of these fictions is that they are always tidier than
the Real; following Poulantzas, Jameson uses this as a starting-point for a
sophistication of the debate about the historical succession of modes of production, arguing for "overlay and structural coexistence" (p. 95) of different
modes as the repressed historical truth; and, in .parallel, he argues against the
current dismissal of the diachronic, using the suggestive model of the X-ray to
demonstrate how the changing forms of history may be apprehended through
observation of the sediment, the fossils and remains thrown up by subterranean
burrowings through time.
And there is very much more: Jameson's by now customary, but still instructive, emphasis on the theological as ideological model and as source of
thinking about technique; his subtle insistence on the need for a continuous
rereading of Hegel; a flexible diagnosis of authorial strategies of containment; and
a ready provision for a plurality of working methods, provided this is always
accompanied by commentary on historical limitation. But he would be the
first to agree that cultural criticism cannot proceed by admiration and circumspect paraphrase, and it seems worthwhile to mentio~ albeit very briefly, four
problems. The" construction of the bourgeois subject in emergent capitalism
and its schizophrenic disintegration in our own time" (p. 12), for instance, is a
faulty, if current, slogan: within the eighteenth century, a correctly historical
interpretation can detect the shapes of disintegration from Defoe to the Gothic,
citing some variant of schizophrenia as part of the original repressed subtext
beneath the pressure to synthetic rewriting. And although the Althusserian
emphasis on totality of structure as a replacement for homological simplicities
is welcome, Jameson cannot entirely avoid" expressive causality" in, for instance,
his adaptations of Hjelmslev and, more particularly, his comments on Conrad's
use of the visual as an alternative to Jamesian "point of view n (pp" 99, 231).
His process of historicizing cultural categories is, perhaps of necessity, incomplete: in his analysis of "magical" narrative, he stops short at the formalist
concept of tlle "donor" as an essential position within story (p. 126), without
noting the economic content of the hypocrisy and lying which often accompanies
the" gifts" of fairy story and legend. Finally, and most significantly, a principal
argument of the book is that narrative is not reflection but symbolic act, a
transformation of prior materials; this is a valuable emphasis, but Jameson tends to
slide into asserting that the particular act at stake is always one of attempted
resolution of contradiction. Again, this may often be the case, but there seems
to be a danger here of reifying and fixing the "literary" into a specific location
within a revised "total structure," whereas the functions devolved onto the
literary may be more various than that. Indeed, this appears to be the
suspicion which prompts the closing comments on the relations between ideo~
logical and utopian functioning, but these are too brief to carry the weight of
the rest of his arguments.
H radical historicization of concepts and categories is the process through
which criticism has its life, then perhaps a few comments on the political unconscious of Tbe.,Political Unconscious would be useful, and here again Greimas'
rectangle can serve a purpose. My suggestion, which cannot be here developed
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fully, is that the ideological closure cited within this book turns on the tenns
"exhibit," "display," "scandal" and "propriety II (used almost always adverbially as in "a properly Marxist analysis"). Jameson, I think, would want to
see these oft-repeated categories as the scheme of an ideological antinomy;
and the antinomy seems to me to be about the possibility of offending against
critical and political acceptances in a world of liberal collusions (correctly
connected by him with a contempt for the reality of political difference). This,
however, lies on the first, stylistic horizon of interpretation; moving to the second,
in which the shape of modes of production can· be revealed, we can mention two
opposing features of the text: first, its evident fascination with the theory
of schizophrenic writing, as exemplified in the work of Deleuze and Guattari;
second, the insistence within The Political Unconscious on Jameson's own
previous work (" I have suggested elsewhere that" is a key phrase). This,
certainly, can be made to reveal a dislocation within the literary mode of
production; there is a sense in which Jameson appears to wish the continuity of
his own work to stand against the fragmented nature of imaginative and critical
process in the late twentieth century. And perhaps we can press this contradiction a little further, wd assign it to the realm of economic disjunction between
the monopoly assimilation represented in the multinational corporation and
discreteness and fragmentation of the world of objects implicit in manic consumerism-to use the historical terms in which he frequently frames his own
argument. The mode of interpretation here advocated would require for its
completion in this particular instance an engagement with the third, global
horizon at which the overall destiny of man makes its reappearance; that, perhaps,
should not be essayed in a review, but the thought of its possibility, and of its
compatibility with a rigorously historical Marxism, is a stimulus challenging
enough to make The Political Unconscious an essential work.
DAVID PUNTER

University of East Anglia

Comic Faith: Tbe Great Tradition from Austen to 'oyce, by Robert M. Polhemus. Ohicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980. Pp. x +
189. $15.00.
As the tide of Robert Polhemus' book, Comic Faith, indicates, he believes that,
among the novelists he studies in nineteenth century England, comedy has become
a replacement for religious feeling. His purpose is to "stress the connection in
these works between their comic intentions and religious concerns." As confidence in religious modes of redemption fades, a spirit of affirmation must be
sought in the vitality of human imagination itself-imagination playing not upon
spiritual aspirations, but upon worldly experience. Thus Polhemus studies
major novels of notably" worldly" writers, beginning with Jane Austen's Emma,
and continuing through Peacock, Dickens, Thackeray, T rollope, Meredith, and
J ce. In each he notes the absence or insufficiency of controlling religious
VlSIOn, and the presence, instead, of a "comic vision," the writer's particular
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"insight and sense of the world that allows him or her to find mirth, to justify
life, and imagine means of the benevolent regeneration of the future."
In Austen's Emma, the comic vision must attempt to reconcile Austen's intelligence and ironic outlook with her need to preserve "orthodox allegiances."
Comedy allows one to see the faults of wilfulness and yet to affirm individualism,
by opening the way for internalized analysis and play, and for the growth of
consciousness that leads ultimately to union with another. As" union" is the
key concept in Austen's book, communion governs Thomas Love Peacock's
vision in Nightmare Abbey. Polhemus argues that the novel's diverse. obsessive,
idea-driven characters represent aspects of the larger human community, brought
together through the urbane communion of those Bacchanalian dinners. In
Dickens the tension with religion is sharper, for A1artin Cbuzzlewit, perhaps his
greatest comic work, is beset with Biblical language, with Pecksniffian moralistic
cant, with the pious homiletics of Tom Pinch; and it hangs loosely on the
structure of the work of spiritual reformation. Polhemus shrewdly diagnoses
the ambivalence of Dickens toward his own moralizing bent, parodied often
in his creations.
Thackeray's Vanity Fair, for all its echoes of Bunyan and Ecclesiastes, is one
of the most worldly books in the literature, yet Polhemus feels that its cynicism
is the cynicism of sacrilege and iconoclasm, of a perspective that stems from
religious absence, in a man who "cannot find God or a celestial plan to redeem
the world." TroIlope's Barchester Towers responds to a secularized, politicised
religion in a "corporate" community with an invocation of faith in a changing
earthly culture. By the time of Meredith's The Egoist, Judeo-Christian belief
has become anachronistic, and secular comedy can best teach morality, penetrating the shams of egoism to teach "respect for cumulative reason and the
process of civilization." Lewis Carroll, of all these figures probably the one most
troubled by Doubt, takes in Tbrougb tbe Looking-Glass the way of regression, to
childhood's freedom and sense of identity, to play and to a more primal ethics.
Finally, in "Shem" in James Joyce's Finnegans Wake all the shibboleths of the
sacred are discarded, and redemption rises through celebration of the profanethe earthly way.
The Victorians felt the slippage of religious conviction keenly-we have ample
evidence of that in their strenuous church-going, church building, evangelicalism,
and preaching of duty and morality. And we have ample evidence of the
Victorian propensity to sanctify worldly and material concerns. Polhemus rightly
sees comedy as a life-affirming expression, one that reconciles us to our worldly
preoccupations and desires. Yet, as he is the first to point out, this process
had been occurring gradually for some time: "the revival of, and comparatively
tolerant attitude toward, comic art in the British Reformation, Renaissance, and
Restoration eras signifies the widespread ideological turning-back-to-the-world."
Comedy had traditionally, as he notes, functioned as a reconciliation to the
mundane. Consequently, it is difficult to perceive the dialectic of the religious
and the comic working acutely in these writers of the nineteenth century. The
tolerance that comedy inculcates had been long established, and even though
religiously based structural forms and religious language may inform these books,
there is rarely any strong sense of the struggle between sacred and comic visions.
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Polhemus' studies do not give one the impression that a writer such' as Meredith
or Trollope is consciously, systematically developing a comic vision in response
to the loss of belief in religion, or even as a turning to the worldly. This means
that the tension imolicit in an assertion of "comic Faith" is muted. Comedy
still can be a mean~ of faith, but not one achieved by each of these writers
through a dialectic with traditional modes of belief.
Polhemus' self-described "procedure" makes clear that his book was never
intended simply to demonstrate such a dialectical relationship, and that in large
part what he seeks to do is explore the richness and variation of comic art. And
this he does well, often eloquently. His case for the comedy of regression in
Carroll is particularly well argued; the chapter on The Egoist is sensitive and
deft; and throughout one encounters highly insightful readings, as in his
observation of the way in which Becky Sharp's spontaneity habitually settles into
some form of inanimateness or conventional calculation, or in his demonstration
of the use of conversation in Trollope to allow characters to redefine themselves,
or in his description of the ways of diversion in Alice.
,It is Polhemus' experientially open sensibility, in fact, that allows us to discern
a significant motif that emerges from his study. He frequently shows how
comedy encourages us to take delight in human selfishness and self-seeking. In
too many theoretical writings on the comic, this element has been denied, on
the assumption that comedy's "tendentious" character implies that our pleasure
comes from seeing selfishness exposed and ridiculed. In actuality, we often enjoy
the foibles of others, and Polhemus compellingly argues that in a writer such as
Austen the play of ironic, reflexive consciousness that is the path to true morality
occurs "Within the matrix of Emma's self-seeking. One is struck, as one moves
through this book, by the number of instances in which nineteenth-century
fictional comedy explores elements of egoism, self-assertion, or self-protection.
l\1eredith's novel offers the most obvious example, in which the often acerbic,
but finally metamorphic comic spirit finds its field of play in male egoism.
Polhemus writes: "l\1eredith, with his love and feel for nature, was groping for
a comic vision that ,,'.'ould transcend the egoistical basis of both divine comedy
and human comedy. He was pushing for a change of allegiance from self to
species and world organism: no longer To thine own self be truej instead, Be true
to the whole earth and humanity."
One can observe similar patterns in Vanity Fair (where comedy's object is the
competitive, acquisitive urge), in lvlartin Cbuzzlewit {where the richest humor
springs from the devices of Sara Gamp, Pecksniff, and Montague Tigg) , in
Carroll's Alice, and in Barcbester Towers. Even in Nightmare Abbey the isolation and self-absorption of the various intellectual types triggers the comic
distancing that allows us to move on to the objective of the work: a fuller
perspective on human nature. Polhemus has identified a process that, in these
novels at least, occurs again and again. In his studies, comedy springs from
the dynamics of egoism or self-assertion, and its metamorphic powers are then
used to transform or redirect such impulses in a way that provides us with a
broader, more regenerative, perspective. Barchester Towers makes a nice case in
point, for Trollope shows how commonality has been broken into factionalism
and selfishness, and then, as Polhemus demonstrates, he employs his cornie
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vision to establish a community of outlook and common sense among his readers.
True to the times, Victorian comic writers began to look at the self-absorbed
quality of modem life. True also to their culture, they sought to affirm
community. As this effort became more and more an act of faith, and as the
comic became the means for putting the personal into broader perspective, they
did in fact develop another kind of comic faith.
ROGER

B.

HENKLE

Brown University

Free Verse: An Essay on Prosody by Charles O. Hartman. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980. Pp. x + 199. $14.00.
Free verse was one of the revolutions, along with Imagism and other associated
movements, that created modern poetry. The literary battles caused by its
advent into English poetry early in this century belong to literary history, but
Charles O. Hartman knows that it is still necessary to state unambiguously, "Free
verse, like all verse, is prosodically ordered and not aimless" (p. 24). Just what
that prosodic order is, what remains that distinguishes verse from prose after
a regular meter, patterns of end-rhyme, and fixed stanza-forms are gone, has
received various critical interpretations, but the issue has still not been resolved
by literary criticism. Something-and it may be something in the nature of the
critical interpretations themselves-has prevented our having a comprehensive
poetics of modern poetry.
Hartman modestly presents his book as an "essay n on the prosody of free
verse, not as a definitive study of modern poetics. In this lucid and intelligent
work he is trying out two related ideas about the prosodic order of modern
poetry. Both ideas derive from traditional concepts in literary criticism, and
they are adapted and renewed by Hartman to deal with free verse. The lineby-line prosodic organization of free verse, he argues, lies in the" counterpoint"
of syntax and lineation, and the overall structure of free verse lies in a fusion of
pattern and meaning which he calls II discovered form."
The idea of prosodic II counterpoint" is an analogy taken from music (not
a particularly accurate one, but it serves). Also known in literary criticism as
" syncopation" or simply "tension," it is usually used to describe the effects of
the various and irregularly changing movements of language heard against a steady
background of regular meter: the interplay of an actual rhythm and an abstract
rhythm. The word itself seems to have entered literary criticism in Gerard
Manley Hopkins' "Author's Preface," where Hopkins described counterpoint
in poetry as II the superinducing or mounting of a new rhythm" upon the basic
metrical pattern so that "two rhythms are in some manner running at once"
(Poems, ed. W. H. Gardner and N. H. MacKenzie, 4th ed. corrected [1970], p.
46). But there is no metrical pattern in free verse, and Hartman uses "counterpoint" to mean instead the interplay between the semantic rhythms of phrases
and sentences anfi the rhythms of the verse-line itself. Lineation is the one prosodic convention kept by all free verse; it is a "formal resource" which in f.ree
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verse can serve in the place of meter and end-rhyme. Hartman's central point,
then, is that the counterpoint bcnveen syntax and lineation is the general basis
of free-verse prosody.
There is some question, of course, whether we can hear the lineation in a
free-verse poem, and then hear it in counterpoint against the rhythms of syntax.
Hartman suggests that the convention of lineation (something seen) has created
the convention of a pause (something heard) at the end of a line, and poets now
can "assume the pause as a product of lineation and use it to interrupt syntactical units" Cp.73). His most convincing proof, however, comes in his many
excellent demonstrations that this is in fact what poets do. To take just one
example, a version of Auden's "Musee des Beaux Arts" in which line-endings
correspond with the breaks made by syntax and punctuation is set beside the
version Auden actually wrote, in which line-endings regularly break up the
syntactical units of phrases and sentences, and syntactical pauses or complete
stops break up the formal unit of the line. The first version yields a logical but
dull prosody, and a rather weary and tedious voice in the poem; Auden's version,
in contrast, presents a far more complicated and energetic prosody, and adds
an emerging awe and even celebration to the voice in the poem. Auden's prosodic counterpoint, in other words, changes not only how the poem sounds but
what the poem means. Prosody, Hartman affirms, is always in the service of
meaning.
The close relationship of prosody and meaning is a principle that also guides
the other main topic of Hartman's book, which concerns the overall form of
free-verse poems. Along with metrical lines, free verse abandoned regular
stanza-forms. Hartman's idea of a "discovered form" unique to each poem
renews the Coleridgean concept of "organic form." The apparently haphazard
indentions, spacings, and stanza-breaks of a free-verse poem, he writes, are formal
patterns which both follow and guide the patterns of meaning in the poem. The
distinction between" form" and " content," in fact, dissolves, for the meaning of
a poem inheres as much in form as in content-the form becomes the content.
"Discovered form" is not a "box" but an "incarnation" (p. 89). A careful
analysis of Wallace Stevens' "Valley Candle," for example, shows us that
"Meaning arises not from what the poem says, but from what it does and the
doing that it represents" (p. 85).
Free Verse is a helpful and clearly-written book. Hartman works in the
practical tradition of Anglo-American criticism: he listens carefully to poems and
to what poets have said about poetry. COllUTIon sense and a good ear are the
real foundations of his study; he steers clear of unnecessary jargon, elaborate
systems, and the imposition of external intellectual categories on the living
language of poems. Readers of poetry can enter this book with hope and
leave it with gratitude. They will also leave it with thoughts and questions
that range beyond, or behind, the scope of Hartman's essay. It seems clear, for
example, that any prosodic order must be drawn from language. Hartman's
ideas of "counterpoint" and "discovered form" describe something that poets
do, some of them very skillfully (such as William Carlos Williams). But that is
not all they do. There is an ordering music in the sounds of words-·a rhythm
emerging from the echoing of internal rhymes, alliterations, assonances, con-
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sonances, word-repetitions-that also is basic to free-verse prosody. This rhythm
can be used to support the line-unit, but it is radically a separate system of
rhythm which can reach across lines and itself create a counterpoint against both
lineation and syntax. There is also a music drawn from the phrasal rhythms of
speech. These are units of rhythm inherent in the spoken language, made up of
progressions of stress, juncture, quantity, pitch-all the elements that give a
distinctive contour to a spoken English phrase. Phrasal units can be repeated
and varied in a manner analogous to the recurrence of identity and variation in the
metrical units of traditional prosody. Wallace Stevens used this music beautifully, but it is an organizing principle of poetry at least as old as Wyatt.
(Hartman is of course aware of these systems of rhythm, but he considers the
first to be merely an ornament of the line-unit, and he rejects the second as a
possibility for prosody.) Finally, there is a "syntax" in modern poetry which
is not that of prose, a syntax of perceptions and images, and of sudden jumps and
complex simultaneities, which cannot be accounted for by a traditionally conceived system of prosody. Ezra Pound's poetry often depends on such" syntax,"
but it is not a syntax that can be heard or described by prosodic" counterpoint."
The forms wc have inherited for discussing these issues are the central critical
problem; we simply do not yet have the critical forms for dealing with modern

poetry.
When we do develop those critical forms, when we have a poetics of modem
poetry, the relationship between prosody and meaning-the idea of II organic
form," if we choose to keep that term-will be central. But the relationship
between sound, rhythm, and poetic form on the one hand, and the lexical and
syntactical meaning of a poem on the other, cannot be seen as in any way
direct or linear. It is clear that good poets bring together prosody and meaning;
but that is not the same thing as saying "prosody both determines and derives
from meaning" (p. 179). This view of "organic form" loses sight of the
basically independent nature, even in free verse, of sound, rhythm, and form.
It neglects human delight in form itself, and the artist's delight in his materials and
his own performance. Moreover, though sound, rhythm, and form certainly
communicate, they do not speak the same langu2.ge spoken by lexis and syntax,
and they cannot "mean" the same things. If poets can bring these two
languages together in poems, can make prosody seem an echo to the sense, it
is because the mind experiences movements which are not "sense" but which
can be made into the rhythms and foons of sense-rhythms of perceiving and
thinking which attend perception and thought. The poem speaks in both
languages, and the good reader hears both. What happens in the poem and
what happens in the reader are not simple relationships-not the direct mimesis
of meaning by rhythm, or the direct enactment of idea by form-but a complex
ordering of kinships in territories still to be mapped.
ANDREW WELSH

Rutgers University
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Interpretation: An Essay in the Pbilosopby of Literary Criticism, by P. D. Juhl.
Princeton: Princeton Universiry Press, 1980. Pp. x + 332. $20.00.
Juhl's book is the first since Hirsch's VaUdity in Interpretation to survey the
entire range of problems involved in current interpretive theory. Since the
publication of the latter in 1967, philosophers and critics in America and Germany
have submitted the issues Hirsch treated to analytic scrutiny, and a renewed
interest in the philosophy of language and concepts of intention has altered
the ways in which these issues are now perceived. Within this tradition, Juhl
has proposed a novel thesis about the relationship between intention and meaning.
The intricate arguments of others are not fully represented in his book, but he
treats the most important of them and calls attention to the relevant literature in
footnotes. That I disagree with much of what he says is less an objective criticism
of his book than a tribute to its provocativeness and an aclmowledgment of the
interest with which I read it.
His main claims are these: (1) "a statement about the meaning of a work is
a statement about the author's intention" (i. e., one analytically entails the other);
(2) our construal of a literary work" is determined not by our picture of the
so-called implied author, but rather by our picture of the real, historical
person" ; and (3) "a literary work has one and only one correct interpretation"
(pp.12-13). A skeletal account of the arguments that support these claims can be
~cquired by reading the introductory and concluding secti~:ms of each chapter.
Rather than recapitulating Juhl's lucid summaries, I shall try to describe the
context within which his arguments take on their importance, and the problems
they entail.
In claiming that there is an inherent or analytic relationship between authorial
intention and literary meaning, Juhl implies that no empirical evidence can controvert his assertion, and that his definitions of the words "meaning" and
"intention" are reportive, not stipulative. The discovery of analytic truths is a
tricky business. Rather than simply disproving arguments against them, one
must show that they really assume what they intend to deny. If the demonstration is successful, nothing in the world of empirical evidence and conclusions
has been called into question. What then is changed? Only our way of seeing,
or our way of using words.
Assuming (without reason) that we lrnow what" meaning" means, we might
begin by examining the word "intention." Within the narrow confines of
analytic philosophy, one recent writer has discriminated nine uses of the term.
For cruder purposes, I shall distinguish four: (1) "intention" as intentionality
in the phenomenological sense, the property of consciousness whereby it intends
or refers to an object; (2) the sense emphasized by Anscombe and others in
the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, intention as purpose or teleological
aim, when an action is performed to achieve a certain end (Wimsatt and Beardsley belatedly acknowledged the importance of this sense when, seven years after
It The Intentional Fallacy" they confessed that the U whole actual meaning" of a
literary work might legitimately be called its "intent" [Dictionary of World
Literature, pp. 231-32].); (3) in ordinary usage, "intention" as what one plans
and wills to do in the future and in this sense clearly distinguished from achieve-
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ment (this meaning is crucial to the best-known arguments of Wimsatt and
Beardsley); (4) again in ordinary usage, intentional actions as opposed to those
that are habitual, unconscious, "unconsciously" intended, or those having
unintended consequences.
What then of Juhl's claim that a literary work necessarily means what the
author intended it to mean (a position more conservative than that of Hirsch,
whose arguments are criticized in the first chapter)? From a phenomenological
point of view (definition 1 above) the claim is unexceptionable. To mean is
to intend, and the erosion of a rock that coincidentally produced an English
sentence (one of Juhl's examples) would not in this sense have any meaning.
Likewise, as Juhl argues in chapters three and foUr, to say that one part of
a text has a certain meaning because of its relationship to the whole entails a
concept of human intention (definition 2 above): "coherence" is a criterion
of meaning only if there is an intention to cohere. (Since the natural sciences
use coherence as a test of truth, one might be forced to argue that they too
presuppose an intentional creator-an argument that has been refurbished for
intentionalism by Robert Hambourger in Intention and Intentionality, ed. C.
Diamond and J. Teichman). Juhl is most convincing when he recapitulates
arguments that oppose the intentionalist thesis and shows that their authors
have, unintentionally, relied on assumptions about authorial intention. When
he discusses Beardsley's interpretation of a poem by W ords\\yorth, accepting
Beardsley's arguments but pointing out that the word" intention" can be inserted
in them without altering the character of the evidence, one feels that his thesis
is truly analytic.
.
So long as his argument remains analytic, it cannot be challenged, nor can it
make any practical difference. But once he implies that evidence about intentions
is evidence about meaning, his argument has become perfQrce synthetic. He
strays from his original definition of II author's intention" as II what he meant
by the words he used" (tauto1ogically true, in definitions 1 and 2 above) to show
that we can obtain evidence about intentions that points to a particular meaning.
The unstated assumption-or rather, analytic claim-imderlying the transition
appears ot be this: that an author II intends"·a life-meaning whereby the intention
to mean something in writing a particular work is subtended by his other writings,
beliefs, statements of intention, thoughts, etc. It is only on the basis of this
claim that there could be an analytic relationship (involving coherence) between
intending to mean in one act of writing and iritentions, beliefs, values on other
occasions. Short of guaranteeing the intentional coherence of a life, inference
from one act to another is ungrounded andlor synthetic; if the grounding is
analytic, it cannot affect the practice of interpretation.
It is to JuhI's credit that he recognizes this problem and eventually dismembers
the integral "intention" that previously served as a referent for establishing
meaning: "a text may be better evidence of a man's intention than his explicit
statement" Cp. 147); II artists no less than other people change their minds,
contradict themselves, or are ambivalent in their attitudes" (p. 188). The
first of these statements reveals that the word II intention" is used in two senses.
"\¥hen the text serves as good evidence of the author's "intention," the word
is used in the analyti-c sense-intention and meaning are the same. When
"explicit staetment" of intention is not unquestionable evidence about meaning,
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then "intention" .has one of its ,or.dina,ry -uses, ,in which declared intention and
meaning may fail to match.
The best 'evidence Juhl presents in opposition to his own thesis appears
when he analyzes the arguments of other critics. Typically, they make up an
example and tnen e~plain what it demonstrates-i. c., what they intend it to
mean. But Juhl disagrees with them. How Can he do so, given his assumption
that the example means- wh~t its creator intended it to mean? The problem is
an important one because literary works seem very like the imaginary examples
used by philosophers, except that the former are not accompanied by an explanation of the meaning they arc intended to illustrate.
Juhl denies that literary language is different in kind, or entails different interpretive conventions, than ordinary uses of language. Like speech-act critics,
he uses single sentences as examples in discussing problems of ambiguity. One
may admit t'hat in understanding the succesive ,sentences of a novel, for example,
we make decisions about meaning very much as we would in understanding
everyday language, yet deny that the interpretation of the whole novel, extrapolating from an instance ,to a general" meaning," is the same sort of interpretive
act. There is an odd lacuna in his overall argument. If literary meaning is the
author's intentional meaning, one might expect Juhl to claim that a literary work
"has one and only one correct interpretation" by virtue of the (analytic) fact
that authors intend only one meaning. But he clearly and carefully says that
he is simply arguing in favor of ,this conclusion in the last chapter of the book.
If a work has just .one meaning, then by his thesis that fact can only result from
the author's intending just one meaning; should an author intend more than one,
luhl would of necessity disavow the general applicability of his argument. The
lack of reference to authorial intention in this chapter is one of the puzzles of the
book.
He concludes that" there is good reason to believe that any interpretation of a
given text can.in principle be shown to be correct or incorrect," but that "this
thesis does not reduce or eliminate multiplicity of meaning in the usual sense ....
Nor am I claiming that we can in fact resolve any significant number of interpretive controversies" (p. 236). In a sense, then, his book is in the end analytic:
it may provide "reason to believe" but does not alter the practice of interpretation. The arguments against other critics are more convincing than those
in favor of 'his own position (Peter Szondi is anatomized with particular precision in the Appendix). If Juhl is right in arguing that literary interpretation is,
in all essential respects, like interpretation of other uses of language, there is
really no place for a "philosophy of criticism," as distinct from philosophy in
general, and critics might turn their attention to what philosophers say on the
subject of intention. Juhl provides -an introduction to the subject, but the
opponents of Grice deserve a hearing. John Biro's" Intentionalism in the Theory
of Meaning" (!lionist, 62 [1979], 238-58) is one of many articles that challenge
his view, which Biro refers to ,as "meaning nominalism." In the foregoing cririque, I have tried to accept Juhl's assumptions and argue against the inferences he
makes from them; opponents of his position (for example, new critics and
deconstructionists) will in all likelihood take issue ,vith his assumptions.
WALLACE MAltTIN
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